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EDUCATION AND THE CONSTITUTION: 
SHAPING EACH OTHER & THE NEXT CENTURY 
 
by 
 
Elizabeth Reilly* 
 
This issue proudly presents the University of Akron’s Constitutional Law Center 
Symposium on Education and the Constitution.  We are pleased to have assembled such 
an impressive array of scholars in both education and constitutional law to address many 
of the issues in which educational policy and constitutional law overlap.   
 
I.  PROLOGUE 
 
Thinking about the interaction between the Constitution and education reveals that they 
are deeply interconnected, at profound levels of interdependence and complexity.  Those 
connections are often strikingly visible, but are sometimes quite subtle. 
 
A fundamental interdependence was formed with the decision to formulate our 
governmental structure as a democratic republic. The Constitution created the necessity 
for adequate public education to prepare the citizenry to exercise the role of self-
government.1 An educated voting public underpins a successful democratic structure, as 
was explicitly recognized in Brown v. Board of Education, in which the Court 
acknowledged: 
 
the importance of education to our democratic society.  It is required in the 
performance of our most basic public responsibilities . . . . It is the very 
foundation of citizenship.  Today it is the principal instrument for 
awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later 
                                                          
* Associate Dean and C. Blake McDowell, Jr., Professor of Law, University of Akron School of Law.  J.D., 
University of Akron; A.B., Princeton University.  Thank you to my excellent research assistants Lidia 
Kapoustina Hamm and Krista Piersol, and to my colleagues Richard Aynes, J. Dean Carro, Malina 
Coleman, and Wilson Huhn for comments on earlier drafts. 
1 Suzanna Sherry, Responsible Republicanism:  Educating for Citizenship, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 131, 182, 
187-88 (1995) (noting that responsible citizenship depends upon education).  Thurgood Marshall's 
argument in Cooper v. Aaron eloquently raises the question of the values we teach by what we do.  358 
U.S. 1 (1988). 
Several state constitutions and courts have explicitly made this link, e.g., California Ass’n for 
Safety Educ. v. Brown, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d 404 (1994) (noting that when the free school guarantee in 
California was enacted at the 1878-1879 Constitutional Convention.  Joseph Winans, the chairperson for 
the convention's Committee on Education, stated that "public education forms the basis of self-government 
and constitutes the very cornerstone of republican institutions."  DEBATES & PROCEEDINGS, CAL. CONST. 
CONVENTION 1878-1879 1087); Hartzell v. Connell, 679 P.2d 35 (1984); Carrollton-Farmers Branch Indep. 
Sch. Dist. v. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist., 826 S.W.2d 489, 532 n.14 (Texas 1992), (Cornyn, J., concurring 
and dissenting) (declaring that a primary goal of public education embraced by the founders of the 
Republic of Texas, which is also an axiom of political science, is that unless a people are educated and 
enlightened, it is idle to expect the continuance of civil liberty, or the capacity for self-government. 
VERNON, THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE OF THE REPUBLIC OF TEXAS 519, 520 ). 
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professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his 
environment.”2 
 
But it is not only our political system that is dependent upon a viable and successful 
educational system.  Our economic system also proclaims its reliance upon well-trained 
and educated workers.3  And our social system rests on two largely accepted goals that 
each require access to education – the “melting pot” which requires the successful 
absorption of diverse immigrant populations into a pluralistic social and cultural 
structure, and “upward mobility” which requires the permeability of class barriers.4  Both 
goals are achieved substantially through the education system.5  
 
II.  ROADMAP TO THE SYMPOSIUM 
 
We chose education as the central issue for this Symposium because of its undoubted 
importance in the lives of the people in this country, and because of the many high-
profile policy debates about education currently capturing the attention of the public.  As 
we enter the twenty-first century, many issues of profound importance confront us: 
school finance;6 racial and gender equality in access and outcomes;7 home schooling;8 
                                                          
2 Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). 
3 See, e.g., Sheff v. O'Neill, 678 A.2d 1267, 1290 (Conn. 1996) (recognizing that adequate education has an 
impact on the "entire state and its economy . . . [which is] . . . dependent on more skilled workers, 
technically proficient workers, literate and well-educated citizens . . . ." The court held that the state, which 
already played an active role in managing public schools, must take further measures to relieve the severe 
racial and poverty inequities that burden public elementary and high school students' education); Abbott v. 
Burke, A.2d 575 (N.J. 1994) (recognizing that adequate education has an impact on the entire state and its 
economy, the court held the Quality Education Act unconstitutional because it failed to assure parity of 
regular education expenditures between the special needs districts and the more affluent districts). 
4  See, e.g., THE NATIONAL COMM’N ON EXCELLENCE IN EDUC., UNITED STATES DEP’T OF EDUC., A 
NATION AT RISK:  THE IMPERATIVE FOR EDUCATIONAL REFORM 7 (1983) (“[a] high level of shared 
education is essential to a free democratic society and to the fostering of a common culture, especially in a 
country that prides itself on pluralism and individual freedom”); ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE SUPREME 
COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 121-22 (1970) (Public schools are a "secular, nationalizing, 
assimilationist agent . . . [charged] with the task of Americanization, of melding backgrounds, and creating 
one nation."); ARNOLD ROSE & CAROLINE ROSE, AMERICA DIVIDED: MINORITY GROUP RELATIONS IN THE 
UNITED STATES 105 (1953) (“The United States has always prided itself on not being a class society, . . . 
[people] could move from one class to another.”); THOMAS SOWELL, ETHNIC AMERICA: A HISTORY 3 
(1981) (“A massive stream of humanity . . . came speaking every language and representing every 
nationality, race, and religion.”); Jessica J. Josephson, TV and the Not-So-Soft Sell, Special to WASH. POST, 
June 12, 1977, at D3 ("culture within our culture has different sets of symbols which evolved from different 
original frames of reference – it's the concept of America as a melting pot.  And our culture has been and is 
very fundamentally defined by upward mobility and money as positive values"); Pico Iyer, The Global 
Village Finally Arrives, TIME, Sept. 22, 1993, at 86 ("Calvinists – import all-American values of hard work 
and family closeness and entrepreneurial energy to America, America is sending its values of upward 
mobility and individualism and melting-pot hopefulness to Taipei and Saigon and Bombay."). 
5 See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (finding it unconstitutional to completely deny free public 
education to children not legally admitted to the United States; education is important for maintaining our 
basic institutions, and its deprivation has lasting impact on a child’s life); see also Sherry, supra note 1. 
6 Representative state cases include:  Roosevelt Elem. Sch. Dist. No. 66 v. Bishop, 877 P.2d 806 (Ariz. 
1994) (holding that the system for financing public schools did not satisfy the constitutional mandate of a 
general and uniform school system); Butt v. State, 842 P.2d 1240 (Cal. 1992) (holding that the State has a 
constitutional duty, aside from the equal allocation of educational funds, to prevent the budgetary problems 
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of a particular school district from depriving its students of "basic" educational equality); Coalition For 
Adequacy & Fairness In Sch. Funding v. Chiles, 680 So.2d 400 (Fla. 1996) (holding that plaintiffs failed to 
demonstrate that the legislature failed to provide an adequate and uniform system of free public schools); 
Unified Sch. Dist. No. 229 v. State, 885 P.2d 1170 (Kan. 1994) (holding that the School District Finance 
and Quality Performance Act was constitutionally permissible legislation); McDuffy v. Secretary of the 
Exec. Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516 (Mass. 1993) (holding that the Massachusetts Constitution imposed 
an enforceable duty to provide education in the public schools for all children, rich or poor, and without 
regard to the fiscal capacity of the community or district in which such children live, and declaring that the 
constitutional duty was not being currently fulfilled by the Commonwealth, which must take steps to devise 
a plan and sources of funds sufficient to meet the constitutional mandate); Council of Orgs. & Others for 
Educ. About Parochial v. Governor, 566 N.W.2d 208 (Mich. 1997) (holding that PA Charter Schools Act, 
which authorized the creation of public school academies, did not violate Michigan Constitution article 
VIII, §§ 2-3); Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299 (Minn. 1993) (holding that the state constitutional provision 
requiring the legislature to establish a "general and uniform system of public schools" indicated that 
education is a fundamental right in Minnesota and that the current system of state educational finance 
satisfied that fundamental right because all plaintiff districts provided an adequate level of education to 
meet or exceed the state's basic educational requirements and were given sufficient funding to meet their 
basic needs); Fiscal Equity v. State, 655 N.E.2d 661, (N.Y. 1995) (holding that New York Constitution, 
article XI, § 1 required the State to offer all children the opportunity of a sound basic education consisting 
of the basic literacy, calculating, and verbal skills necessary to enable them to eventually function 
productively as civic participants capable of voting and serving on a jury; the State satisfied its 
constitutional obligation if the physical facilities and pedagogical services and resources were adequate to 
provide children with the opportunity to obtain these essential skills); Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249 
(1997) (holding that the "equal opportunities" clause of Art. IX, § 2(1) of the North Carolina Constitution 
did not require substantially equal funding or educational advantages in all school districts, and that the 
current state system for funding schools which resulted in unequal funding among the school districts of the 
state did not violate constitutional principles); DeRolph v. State, 677 N.E.2d 733 (Ohio 1997) (holding that 
Ohio's elementary and secondary public school financing system violated § 2, art. VI of the Ohio 
Constitution, which mandates a thorough and efficient system of common schools throughout the state), 
DeRolph v. State, 728 N.E.2d 993 (Ohio 2000) (holding that legislative funding schemes to date, although 
good faith starts, were not sufficient, and providing an additional year for the governor and legislature to 
find adequate solutions); Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Meno, 917 S.W.2d 717 (Tex. 1995) (holding the 
public school finance system enacted in Senate Bill 7 constitutional, but emphasizing that the judgment in 
this case should not be interpreted as a signal that the school finance crisis in Texas had ended); Campbell 
County Sch. Dist. v. State, 907 P.2d 1238 (Wyo. 1995) (holding that the legislature must be afforded ample 
time for adequate study, drafting of appropriate reform legislation, and debate on and passage of that 
legislation to achieve constitutional compliance with school finance); see also cases cited in Sherry, supra 
note 1, at 194, n.269. 
7 See, e.g., Sheff v. O’Neill, 678 A.2d 1267 (Conn. 1996) (holding that the state must take further measures 
to relieve the severe racial and poverty inequities that burden public elementary and high school students' 
education); Sheff v. O’Neill, 733 A.2d 925 (Conn. 1999) (holding that the State had devised a 
comprehensive, interrelated, well-funded set of programs and legislation designed to improve education for 
all children, with a special emphasis on urban children, while promoting diverse educational 
environments); Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm’n v. School Dist., 638 A.2d 304 (Pa. 1994) (holding 
that the School District had not provided Black and Hispanic students equal access to, among other things, 
the best qualified and most experienced teachers, equal physical facilities and plants, equal access to 
advanced or special admissions academic course offerings, equal allocation of resources, or a commitment 
to eliminating racial imbalances in the schools to the extent feasible). 
8 See, e.g., Donald D. Dorman, Michigan's Teacher Certification Requirement As Applied To Religiously 
Motivated Home Schools, 23 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 733 (1990); Jon S. Lerner, Protecting Home Schooling 
through the Casey Undue Burden Standard, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 363 (1995); Lisa M. Lukasik, The Latest 
Home Education Challenge:  The Relationship Between Home Schools and Public Schools, 74 N.C.L. REV. 
1913 (1996); Jack MacMullan, The Constitutionality of State Home Schooling Statutes, 39 VILL. L. REV. 
1309 (1994); Jospeh P. Tocco, Home Schooling in Michigan:  Is There a Fundamental Right to Teach Your 
Children at Home?, 71 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 1053 (1994). 
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vouchers;9 charter schools (and their manifold manifestations including single-race, 
single-sex, and racially-conscious balanced admissions);10 curricular autonomy and the 
teaching of doctrines associated with religious beliefs;11 high-stakes proficiency testing 
of students;12 and the First Amendment13 and Fourth Amendment14 rights of school 
                                                          
9 See, e.g., Jo Ann Bodemer, School Choice Through Vouchers:  Drawing Constitutional Lemon-Aid From 
The Lemon Test, 70 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 273 (1996); Dominick Cirelli, Jr., Utilizing School Voucher 
Programs To Remedy School Financing Problems, 30 AKRON L. REV. 469 (1997); Douglas A. Edwards, 
Cleveland and Milwaukee's Free Market Solution for the "Pedantic Heaps of Sophistry and Nonsense" 
That Plague Public Education:  Mistakes on Two Lakes?, 30 AKRON L. REV. 687 (1997); Scott A. Fenton, 
School Voucher Programs:  An Idea Whose Time Has Arrived, 26 CAP. U. L. REV. 645 (1997); Molly 
Townes O'Brien, Private School Tuition Vouchers And The Realities Of Racial Politics, 64 TENN. L. REV. 
359 (1997). 
10 See, e.g., Lesley C. Barlow, Review of Selected 1998 California Legislation:  Education:  Chapter 34:  
Initiative Threat Induces Progressive Charter School Legislation, 30 MCGEORGE L. REV. 597 (1999); 
Justin M. Goldstein, Exploring "Unchartered Territory”:  An Analysis of Charter Schools and the 
Applicability of the U.S. Constitution, 7 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 133 (19982); William Haft, Charter 
Schools and The Nineteenth Century Corporation:  A Match Made in the Public Interest, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 
1023 (1998); Jay P. Heubert, Schools Without Rules?  Charter Schools, Federal Disability Law, and the 
Paradoxes of Deregulation, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 301 (1997); Kevin S. Huffman, Charter Schools: 
Equal Protection Litigation, and the New School Reform Movement, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1290 (1998); 
Denise M. Kazlauskas, Education:  Elementary and Secondary Education:  Provide for Charter School 
Statues; Remove Certain Limitations Regarding Advance Capital Outlay Funding for Construction 
Projects to Consolidate or Reorganize Schools; Provide for Contents of Petition Charter; Provide for 
Approval of Charter Schools by Local and State School Boards; Provide for Operational Requirements of 
Charter Schools; Provide for Charter Renewals; Provide for Amendment and Termination of a Charter; 
Establish Duties of State Board of Education and Local School Board with Respect to Provision of Funds 
to Charter Schools; Establish an Office of Charter School Compliance and Provide for Its Responsibilities; 
Provide for Continuing Validity of Certain Charters in Effect on July 1, 1998, 15 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 101 
(1998); Peter J. Perla, The Colorado Charter Schools Act and the Potential for Unconstitutional 
Applications Under Article IX, Section 15 of the State Constitution, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 171 (1996); James 
A. Peyser, Symposium, Issues in Education Law and Policy:  School Choice:  When, Not If, 35 B.C. L. REV. 
619 (1994); Jennifer J. Ridley, Charting a New Course for Public Education in Michigan – Charter 
Schools:  A Significant Step Toward Meaningful Education Reform, 76 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 607 (1999); 
Karla A. Turekian, Traversing the Minefields of Education Reform:  The Legality of Charter Schools, 29 
CONN. L. REV. 1365 (1997); Jennifer T. Wall, The Establishment of Charter Schools:  A Guide to Legal 
Issues for Legislatures, 1998 B.Y.U. EDUC. & L. J. 69 (1998); Sheri Williams, State Foundation of Charter 
Schools in Kansas, 6 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 103 (1997); Jason Lance Wren, Charter Schools:  Public or 
Private?  An Application of the Fourteenth Amendment's State Action Doctrine to These Innovative 
Schools, 19 REV. LITIG. 135 (2000); Note, The Hazards of Making Public Schooling A Private Business, 
112 HARV. L. REV. 695 (1999); Recent Legislation, School Reform – Charter Schools – Connecticut and 
South Carolina Pass Charter School Statutes, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1651 (1997). 
11 E.g., Charles Krauthammer, The Real Message of Creationism, TIME, Nov. 22, 1999, at 120 (discussing 
the Kansas School Board resolution removing evolution from the science curriculum as driven by 
limitations on teaching values through sectarian texts); Margaret Talbot, A Mighty Fortress, THE NEW 
YORK TIMES MAG., Feb. 27, 2000, at 23 (profiling a fundamentalist Christian family that chose home 
schooling to ensure curricular and methodological control and the teaching of parental values); see also 
Sherry, supra note 1, at 160-61 (discussing the pitfalls of parental control for citizenship education). 
12 E.g., N.Y. EDUC. LAW §§ 340-348 (McKinney 2000) (requiring students to complete tests in order to 
graduate); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3301.0711 (Anderson 2000) (requiring testing of students and 
clarifying when that should take place); TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 39.025 (West 2000) (requiring students 
to complete assessment testing in order to receive diploma). 
13 See infra notes 55-58 (cases). 
14 See Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995) (holding that the school district’s mandatory drug 
testing of student athletes did not violate their 4th Amendment rights because the school acts in the capacity 
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students.  There are manifold competing views on the wisdom and constitutional 
acceptability of the strategies now being used and proposed for the future.  What is clear 
is that any policy and practice will be subject to constitutional scrutiny and the 
parameters of acceptability will be set in constitutional terms.  The choices we make will 
both reflect who we are and have a lasting impact on who we become as a people. 
 
The theses of the Symposium are first, that the Constitution, especially as interpreted by 
the Supreme Court, has a significant effect upon public education, and second, that the 
way we educate about the Constitution, implicitly and explicitly, has a significant effect 
upon its meaning.   
 
The first part of the Symposium will concentrate upon the first thesis. These articles15 
primarily explore how the Constitution has affected public education in the twentieth 
century and how it will likely affect public education in the twenty-first century.  
 
The Constitution has had a fundamental impact upon the way we structure and deliver 
public – and by implication, private – education in this country. Many boundaries set by 
the Constitution, as it is interpreted, have resulted directly or indirectly in the existence 
and viability of alternative schooling opportunities.16  Allowing alternative opportunities 
                                                                                                                                                                             
of the children’s guardian); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985) (holding that the 4th Amendment 
standard of probable cause for conducting a search was not the standard necessary for searches conducted 
in the school environment, and that the search conducted for drugs in the student’s purse qualified under 
the lower standard of “reasonable under the circumstances.”). 
15 Kevin Brown, Equal Protection Challenges to the Use of Racial Classifications to Promote Integrated 
Public Elementary and Secondary Student Enrollments; Michael Heise, Preliminary Thoughts on the 
Virtues of Passive Dialogue; Rachel Moran, Sorting and Reforming:  High Stakes Testing in the Public 
Schools; Molly Townes O'Brien, Free at Last?  Charter Schools and the “Deregulated” Curriculum; 
William Ross, The Contemporary Significance of Meyer and Pierce for Parental Rights Issues Involving 
Education; Rosemary Salomone, Rich Kids, Poor Kids, and the Single-Sex Education Debate, 34 AKRON L. 
REV. (in this volume). 
16 For instance, Pierce v. Society of the Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), guaranteed the right of private 
religious schools to both exist and to provide the mandatory education a state might require.  In addition, 
some commentators attribute the flourishing of private schools in the latter half of the twentieth century to 
"white flight" from integrated public schools in the wake of Brown and its progeny.  Compare JOHN 
SAMUEL COLEMAN ET AL., TRENDS IN SCHOOL SEGREGATION 1968-73 (1975) with Thomas F. Pettigrew & 
Robert L. Green, School Desegregation in Large Cities:  A Critique of The Coleman "White Flight" Thesis, 
46 HARV. EDUC. REV. 1 (1976) and Christine H. Rossell, School Desegregation and White Flight, 90 POL. 
SCI. Q. 675 (1975-76); see also Diane Ravich, The "White Flight" Controversy, 51 PUB. INTEREST 135 
(1978).  Several cases have noted the "white flight" argument:  Monroe v. Board of Comm’rs, 391 U.S. 450 
(1968) (rejecting an argument in favor of "free transfers" that defended the transfers as necessary to prevent 
white flight); Brunson v. Clarendon Sch. Dist. Bd. of Trustees, 429 F.2d 820 (4th Cir. 1970) (noting the 
troublesome phenomenon of potential white flight). 
The cases striking down school prayer (e.g., Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962); Abington Sch. 
Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963)); prohibiting the posting of the Ten Commandments (Stone v. 
Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980)) and the teaching of the Bible (Schempp); and invalidating statutes mandating 
the teaching of creationism (Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987)), have led to a burgeoning not only 
of Christian schools, but also of home schooling. See, e.g., Neal Devins, Fundamentalist Christian 
Educators v. State:  An Inevitable Compromise, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 818 (1992); Donald D. Dorman, 
Teacher Certification Requirement As Applied To Religiously Motivated Home Schools, 23 U. MICH. J.L. 
REF. 733 (1990). 
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while furthering nation building, pluralism, and anti-discrimination has proven to be a 
challenge to policymakers. 
 
The second part of the Symposium will address the influence that our teaching of the 
Constitution has and will have on the development of constitutional law.  The articles 
address this issue in the law school context – how we train future judges, litigators, and 
civil leaders to think about and work with the Constitution - and also examine civic 
education in general.17 
 
Just as the Constitution and its application has influenced the delivery of education, the 
way we educate has profoundly affected the way in which (and the direction in which) 
the Constitution has developed and will develop in the next century. 
 
III.  THE INTERACTION OF THE CONSTITUTION WITH EDUCATION 
 
This brief essay examines part of the nature of the relationship between education and our 
Constitution.  First, it describes the important role played by the interaction between the 
public education context and the development of fundamental constitutional principles 
that apply far beyond the confines of the schoolhouse gate.18 Second, it touches on the 
impact that the application of constitutional principles has had upon the face of public 
and private education.  Finally, it notes the interrelationship between how we teach – both 
the explicit and the implicit curriculum – and how the Constitution is developed and 
applied. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Finally, the restriction of race-conscious remedies to create racial diversity and balance in public 
schools, e.g., Wessman v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790 (1st Cir. 1998) (holding that the admission process used by 
the city of Boston’s “examination schools,” which use race as a determining factor, are in violation of the 
Constitution, even though they were following a 1975 court order to maintain 35% African-Americans or 
Hispanic students in the schools) has led to creative ideas such as magnet schools and charter schools as 
methods to achieve diversity or the freedom to use race conscious policies.  See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 
433 U.S. 267 (1977) (Milliken II) (endorsing a plan of extensive educational reform such as remedial 
education, counseling and career guidance, to promote racial balance); Hart v. Community Sch. Bd. of 
Brooklyn, 383 F. Supp. 769 (E.D.N.Y. 1974) (endorsing a magnet school as a good way to begin 
desegregation). 
17 Michael Kent Curtis, Teaching Free Speech from an Incomplete Fossil Record; Paul Finkelman, 
Teaching Slavery in American Constitutional Law; Stephen Gottlieb, The Passing of the Cardozo 
Generations; Mark Tushnet, Thinking About the Constitution at the Cusp; Tyll van Geel, Citizenship 
Education and the Free Exercise of Religion (admirably meshing both symposium themes); James Wilson, 
Why a Fundamental Right to a Quality Education Is Not Enough, 34 AKRON L. REV. (in this volume). 
18 Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District, famously noted that children do not  “shed 
constitutional rights … at the schoolhouse gate.” 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).  This declaration has turned out 
to mean not only that the Constitution applies within the school, but that the principles developed to apply 
within the gates have force on the outside as well. Although Tinker envisioned penetrating into the school, 
the body of our constitutional law also makes clear that the way we apply the Constitution inside schools 
profoundly affects the constitutional principles used in different contexts.  The schoolhouse has been a 
fertile context for developing principles that permeate its gates. 
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A.  Education as Context for Constitutional Development 
 
Although it is not an explicit theme of this Symposium, we cannot ignore the remarkable 
degree to which Constitutional cases of the twentieth century that have defined key areas 
of constitutional development have arisen in the context of public education.  Education 
cases have been a breeding ground for decisions that define the nature of the relationships 
between the State and personal choice; the State and racial discrimination; and the State 
and religion. Individual autonomy, affirmative remedies for racial inequality, and the way 
we draw the line between church and state are all firmly grounded in education cases. 
 
It is probably unsurprising that public education and constitutional development have 
been so inextricably linked to each other. Public education creates myriad interactions 
with citizens that constitute state action.19  Compulsory education guarantees that all 
children, and their parents, will interact with the state.  Pluralistic society guarantees that 
many children and parents will disagree with the approach the state takes.  In 
combination, these factors guarantee challenges to state authority to act.  Additionally, 
                                                          
19 Since state constitutions usually guarantee public education, it is a universal form of direct state action: 
ALA. CONST. art. XIV, §256 (“liberal system of public schools”); ALASKA CONST. art. VII, §1 (“public 
schools open to all”); ARIZ. CONST. art. XI, §6 (“a free school shall be established”); ARK. CONST. art. XIV, 
§1 (“system of free public schools”); CAL. CONST. art. IX, §5 (“a free school shall be kept”); COLO. CONST. 
art. IX, §2 (“free public schools . . . wherein all residents . . . may be educated gratuitously”); CONN. 
CONST. art. VIII, §1 (“There shall always be free public elementary and secondary schools in the state.”); 
DEL. CONST. art. X, §1 (“system of free public schools.”); FLA. CONST. art. IX, §1 (“high quality system of 
free public schools”); GA. CONST. art. VIII, §1 (“public education . .  shall be free”); HAW. CONST. art. X, 
§1 (“a statewide system of public schools”); IDAHO CONST. art. IX, §1 (“public, free common schools”); 
ILL. CONST. art. X, §1 (“Education in public schools through secondary level shall be free”); IND. CONST. 
art. VIII, §1 (“uniform system of common schools”); IOWA CONST. art. IX, §3 (“support of common 
schools”); KAN. CONST. art. VI, §1 (“establishing and maintaining public schools”); KY. CONST. §183 
(“provide for . . . common schools”); LA. CONST. art. VIII, §1 (“shall provide for the education of the 
people”); ME. CONST. art. VIII, §1 (“maintenance of public schools”); MD. CONST. art. VIII, §1 (“system of 
Free Public Schools”); MASS. CONST. art. III, §2 (“spreading the advantages and opportunities of 
education”); MICH. CONST. art. VIII, §2 (“free public elementary and secondary schools”); MINN. CONST. 
art. XIII, §1 (“system of public schools”); MISS. CONST. art. VIII, §201 (“free public schools”); MO. 
CONST. art. IX, §1(a) (“maintain free public schools for the gratuitous instruction of all persons”); MONT. 
CONST. art. X, §1 (“free quality public elementary and secondary schools”); NEB. CONST. art. VII, §1 (“free 
instruction in the common schools”); NEV. CONST. art. XI, §2 (“uniform system of common schools”); 
N.H. CONST. art. 83, §2 (“duty to cherish the interest of literature and the sciences”); N.J. CONST. art. VIII 
§4 (“free public schools”); N.M. CONST. art. XII, §1 (“free public schools”); N.Y. CONST. art. XI, §1 (“free 
common schools, wherein all children of this state may be educated”); N.C. CONST. art. IX, §2 (“free public 
schools”); N.D. CONST. art. VIII, §2 (“free public schools”); OHIO CONST. art. VI, §3 (“public school 
system of the state”); OKLA. CONST. art. I, §5 (“public schools, which shall be open to all the children”); 
OR. CONST. art. VIII, §3 (“The legislative assembly shall provide . . . common schools”); PA. CONST. art. 
III, §14 (“system of public education to serve the needs of the Commonwealth”); R.I. CONST. art. XII, §1 
(“promote public schools”); S.C. CONST. art. XI, §3 (“free public schools open to all children”); S.D. 
CONST. art. VIII, §1 (“public schools wherein tuition shall be without charge”); TENN. CONST. art. XI, §12 
(“system of free public schools”); TEX. CONST. art. VII, §1 (“system of public free schools”); UTAH CONST. 
art. X, §1 (“public schools shall be open to all children”); VT. CONST. §68 (“competent number of 
schools”); VA. CONST. art. VIII, §1 (“free public . . . schools for all children”); WASH. CONST. art. IX, §2 
(“uniform system of public schools”); W.VA. CONST. art. XII, §1 (“efficient system of free schools”); WIS. 
CONST. art. X, §4 (“support of common schools”); WYO. CONST. art. VII, §1 (“embracing free elementary 
school of every needed kind and grade”). 
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two flashpoint issues are implicated when parents disagree with state education 
mandates: the upbringing of children in the values of the parents, and the expenditure of 
tax monies. 
 
Three of the central tensions in American life are personal liberty (including self-
definition and family); race relations; and the role of religion in public and private life.  
In each of these arenas, seminal cases have arisen in the context of education. 
 
First, the foundational personal liberty cases that gave rise to the rubric of “privacy” – 
and are still cited as the Court defines the parameters of Fourteenth Amendment “liberty” 
–are Meyer v. Nebraska20 and Pierce v. Society of Sisters.21 Meyer and Pierce recognized 
the deep interest of parents in raising their children to share their values, and in exerting 
control over family life and childrearing.  Thus began the Court’s more general 
recognition of the need to hold some autonomous decisions free from state control.  The 
legacy of Meyer and Pierce includes the privacy decisions that culminated in Griswold,22 
Roe v. Wade,23 Cruzan,24 and Casey.25  
 
Second, significant developments in equality law, especially racial equality law, began in 
the context of public education. Following a multivaried strategy of challenging 
segregation in the context in which it was both likely to be found abhorrent to ideals of 
equality and also likely to lead to fundamental change, Charles Hamilton Houston and 
Thurgood Marshall chose education.26  They began by challenging exclusion in higher 
education,27 then moved to primary education.28 The moral weight of desegregating 
                                                          
20 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (striking down a state law prohibiting the teaching of German in 
schools). 
21  Pierce v. Society of the Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (holding that a state cannot forbid parents from 
meeting the mandatory education requirement by using religious schools that meet secular educational 
standards). 
22 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (recognizing the right of married couples to practice 
contraception as a right stemming from the protection of privacy and intimacy, and from the power to 
control key life-defining decisions). 
23 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (recognizing that personal liberty includes the right to terminate a 
pregnancy). 
24 Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (recognizing a liberty interest in self-
determination and bodily integrity to permit withdrawal of life support). 
25 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (reaffirming the central holding of Roe and 
explicating the importance of a right to control one's body and life path by making key decisions central to 
self-definition). 
26 See RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION ON BLACK 
AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 132-39 (1976) (noting the NAACP and Garland American Fund for 
Public Service strategy to combat racial inequality by attacking segregated public education). 
27 See, e.g., McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950) (finding it unconstitutional to 
require a black student in a white school to occupy designated seats in classroom, library and cafeteria, as it 
inhibited learning and interaction with others); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950) (ordering the state to 
admit a black student to the University of Texas Law School, finding a separate black law school was not 
an equal facility providing an equal education); Sipuel v. Board of Regents, 332 U.S. 631 (1948) (holding a 
state must provide an equal legal education to students of all races); State v. Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. 
Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938) (requiring Missouri to offer legal education to a black student at its own law 
school). 
28 E.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1958). 
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public schools may also have provided an impetus to accept (or require) proactive 
remedies to eradicate the effects of past discrimination.  In Green v. County School 
Board,29  the Court held that a district that has engaged in racial discrimination cannot 
bring itself into compliance with the Equal Protection Clause by simply ending its 
unlawful acts and adopting a neutral stance. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of 
Education30 went even further, declaring that racially neutral remedies for past 
discrimination were inadequate if the consequences of those past acts still influenced or 
controlled present decisions.  North Carolina State Board of Education v. Swann and 
McDaniel v. Barresi31 explicitly allowed school boards to voluntarily adopt plans to 
foster racial pluralism, whether or not there had been a finding of past discrimination.  
Although called into question by recent Circuit Court decisions,32 the case that approved 
the use of a race-conscious criterion to serve the interest of diversity was an education 
case: Regents of University of California v. Bakke.33 
 
Third, many of the primary cases that have defined – or attempted to define –the reach of 
the Religion Clauses, and particularly the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, 
arose in the education context.  Cases articulating the “wall of separation” thesis34 and 
the "accommodation" thesis35 were decided in the public education setting. Religion 
Clause jurisprudence developed significantly in cases addressing public funding or 
assistance to private schools or to religious education,36 as well as in cases challenging 
                                                          
29 Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968). 
30 Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971). 
31 North Carolina State Bd. of Educ. v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43 (1971) (finding that addressing the effects of 
discrimination permits using race as a criterion for assigning students); McDaniel v. Barresi, 402 U.S. 39 
(1971). 
32 E.g., Wessman v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790 (1st Cir. 1998) (holding that the admission process used by 
Boston’s “examination schools,” which use race as a determining factor, violated the Constitution, even 
though they were following a 1975 court order to maintain 35% African-Americans or Hispanic students in 
the schools); Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that University of Texas School of 
Law could not use race as a determining factor in the admission process despite intent to create diversity.). 
33 Regents of Univ. of Ca. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (holding the admissions policy of U.C. Davis 
Medical School unconstitutional in its manner of using race-based standards, but recognizing a legitimate 
interest in the appropriate use of a race-conscious criterion to help achieve diversity). 
34 Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (Justice Black articulated one of the Court’s major 
approaches to the religion clauses and establishment, i.e., the “wall of separation” thesis [with language 
adopted from Jefferson] in an aid to religious schools cases (paying parents for expenses of buses for 
parochial school children); the court upheld paying for all busing, as it merely extended a general public 
welfare program nondiscriminatorily to all citizens).  See also Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 
333 U.S. 203 (1948) (relying upon the separation thesis, the Court held that the Establishment Clause 
prohibits the release of some public school students to attend religious instruction in the school during the 
school day, given by religious leaders; also objected to the compulsory nature of attendance as 
demonstrating state support of religion). 
35 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (holding that Old Order Amish who objected to schooling past 
the eighth grade on religious grounds were entitled to an accommodation from the state’s compulsory 
education age minimum, in order to preserve their Free Exercise rights); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 
(1952) (holding an accommodation which allowed pupils to be released during school to attend religious 
education elsewhere permissible). 
36 E.g., Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997) (general and neutrally-provided supplemental and remedial 
education can be provided to parochial school students); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 
(1993) (holding that sign language interpreters for all students, including those in private sectarian schools, 
is not prohibited by the Establishment Clause); Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Regan, 
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the use of religious speech, such as prayers,37 Bible reading,38 the posting o
Commandments in public schools,
f the Ten 
                                                                                                                                                                            
39 and the mandatory teaching of creationism alongside 
evolution.40 In fact, the classic late twentieth century Establishment test (although 
criticized and sometimes ignored)41 was formulated in an aid to parochial schools case: 
Lemon v. Kurtzman.42  
 
Fourth, by refusing to recognize a fundamental constitutional right to an education, and 
thus deflecting the arguments of poor parents challenging the use of property taxes to 
fund school districts on a differential basis, the Supreme Court left the significant issue of 
school finance to the states.43  Debate still rages over the existence – or nature – of some 
guarantee to an education, and of the role of finances in providing it.44  Wrestling with 
the challenges of these issues has been a significant source of state constitutional 
development.45 As Professor Heise earlier noted, the Supreme Court’s avoidance of the 
issue of equality has had an important effect, as state courts have found that the resolution 
of school finance issues may be more profitably examined under the rubric of the 
adequacy of the education provided as opposed to funding equity in comparison with 
wealthier districts.46  
 
B.  The Impact of the Constitution on the Delivery of Public Education 
 
 
444 U.S. 646 (1980) (a New York statute reimbursing private schools for state-required testing and 
reporting costs is constitutional when those costs are verifiable); Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ., 413 
U.S. 472 (1973) (a New York statute was held unconstitutional as promoting religion because the aid for 
secular functions was not identifiable and separable from aid to sectarian activities); Helms v. Picard, 151 
F.3d 347 (5th Cir. 1998), rev’d sub nom. Mitchell v. Helms, 120 S. Ct. 2530 (2000). 
37 Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (school prayer invalidated as violative of Establishment Clause); 
Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (striking down Bible reading and Lord’s Prayer 
requirement); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (holding that prayer by clergy at public school 
graduation ceremonies, even under nonsectarian guidelines, is violative of Establishment as being coercive, 
potentially divisive, state support for religion); Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 120 S. Ct. 2266, 
(invalidating a policy of student-led, student-initiated prayer before football games). 
38 Abington Sch. Dist., 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (striking down Bible reading and Lord’s Prayer requirement). 
39 Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (striking down a requirement that schools post the Ten 
Commandments). 
40 Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987) (striking down a Louisiana law requiring that creationism be 
taught along with evolution as the religious establishment of a particular view due to there being no 
“genuine” secular purpose). 
41 See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 106-113 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Leading Case, 
Public Funding of Special Education in Parochial Schools, 111 HARV. L. REV. 279 (1997) (critiquing the 
Lemon test). 
42 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (articulating the three-pronged inquiry for Establishment 
Clause purposes of  secular purpose, no primary effect to advance or inhibit religion, and no excessive 
entanglement as the key to future Establishment jurisprudence). 
43 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
44 See, e.g., Sherry, supra note 1, at 186, n.230 (articles). 
45 See supra note 8. 
46 Michael Heise, State Constitutions, School Finance Litigation, and the “Third Wave”: From Equity to 
Adequacy, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1151 (1995). 
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Beyond these conceptual and pragmatic links between our constitutional system and 
education lies the story of the actual impact that our Constitution has had upon the 
delivery of public education.  
 
The very face of education, and the mix of public, private, quasi-public experimental, and 
home-based schooling have been influenced by Constitutional decisions. Meyer and 
Pierce establish not only that nonpublic schools can exist and deliver compulsory 
education, but also that curricular autonomy, including providing religious training, is 
constitutionally protected.  Together with Yoder, these decisions also form some of the 
basis for the permissibility of (and perhaps the requirement for) the home schooling 
option to parents.47 
 
In response to the legal and moral mandate to desegregate, school districts developed 
strategies for integration ranging from race-conscious placements of students to 
reconceptualized school designs and programs, like magnet schools.48 New strategies for 
providing equal and quality education to all children are still being developed at the local 
school level and are continually subjected to scrutiny.49 
 
                                                          
47 See, e.g., Lerner, supra note 8; Lukasik, supra note 8, at n.1; MacMullan, supra note 8; Tocco, supra 
note 8. 
48 See, e.g., Davis v. School Comm’rs, 402 U.S. 33 (1971) (endorsing results-oriented remedies such as 
restructuring attendance zones); Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977) (Milliken II) (adopting a plan of 
extensive educational reform measures to help equalize education and balance racial composition in 
schools); see also Reed v. Rhodes, 472 F.Supp. 615 (N.D. Ohio 1979) (discussing magnet school and 
selection methods to attract “appropriate” racial composition); Stanton v. Sequoia Union High Sch. Dist., 
408 F.Supp. 502 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (closing a high school in a predominately black neighborhood to achieve 
“racial balance”); Moss v. Stamford Bd. of Educ., 356 F.Supp. 675 (D. Conn. 1973) (discussing cross-
district bussing); Hart v. Community Sch. Bd., 383 F.Supp. 769 (E.D. N.Y. 1974) (discussing magnet 
schools).  See also Mary Jane Lee, How Sheff Revives Brown:  Reconsidering Desegregation's Role In 
Creating Equal Educational Opportunity, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 485 (1999); Angela G. Smith, Public School 
Choice and Open Enrollment:  Implications for Education, Desegregation, and Equity, 74 NEB. L. REV. 
255 (1995). 
49 See, e.g., Stuart Biegel, School Choice Policy and Title VI:  Maximizing Equal Access for K-12 Students 
in a Substantially Deregulated Educational Environment, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1533 (1995); Jonathan B. 
Cleveland, School Choice: American Elementary and Secondary Education Enter the "Adapt or Die" 
Environment of a Competitive Marketplace, 29 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 75 (1995); Philip T.K. Daniel, A 
Comprehensive Analysis of Educational Choice:  Can The Polemic of Legal Problems Be Overcome?, 43 
DEPAUL L. REV. 1 (1993); Victoria J. Dodd,  Symposium, American Public Education and Change:  Not an 
Oxymoron, 17 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 109 (1999); Elizabeth Garrett, Symposium, Money, Agenda 
Setting, and Direct Democracy, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1845 (1999); Martha Minow, Choice or Commonality:  
Welfare and Schooling After the End of Welfare As We Knew It, 49 DUKE L.J. 493 (1999); Martha Minow, 
Reforming School Reform, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 257 (1999); Paul E. Peterson, School Choice:  A Report 
Card, 6 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 47 (1998); Joe Price, Educational Reform: Making The Case For Choice, 3 
VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 435 (1996); Kelly C. Rozmus, Education Reform and Education Quality:  Is 
Reconstitution the Answer?, 1998 B.Y.U. EDUC. & L.J. 103 (1998); Joseph P. Viteritti, School Choice:  
Reaching For Equality:  The Salience of School Choice, 14 J. L. & POL. 469 (1998).  Note that one district 
court has invalidated vouchers as used, finding them so heavily used for parochial education as to violate 
the Establishment Clause. Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 72 F.Supp. 2d 834 (N.D. Ohio 1999) (holding that 
school vouchers were unconstitutional because a majority of the participating schools were sectarian, 
creating a situation of governmental endorsed religious education.). 
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The explosion of private educational opportunities is sometimes attributed to 
dissatisfaction with public education.50  These reasons range from the illegitimate 
(fleeing schools deemed to be “too integrated”), to the legitimate (fashioning alterna
to schools deemed too devoid of spiritual and religious content, or too inadequate a
delivering quality basic education in an environment conducive to safety and learning).  
The availability and attractiveness of manifold private and public schooling options may 
have been fueled by the Constitutional mandates and restrictions imposed on public 
schools.   
tives 
t 
                                                          
 
But the quest for quality education transcends the issues of racial and religious diversity 
or hegemony.  Many scholars urge increasing parental control over (or input into) 
curricular matters and the methodology of teaching.51  Race- and class-based gaps in 
educational achievement have led to the search for more effective learning for all 
children.52  These goals have fueled the policy debates for mandatory testing of 
fundamental educational achievement, as well as for creating alternative schools to serve 
public school children’s needs.  Proponents of alternatives seek more state financial 
support with less state control of the content and methodology of the educational 
experience.  These desires coexist in tension with each other.  
 
Underlying many of these issues, and existing independently of them, is the concern 
about finding appropriate mechanisms for funding schools that will provide adequate 
support, fairly distributed, while holding individual schools accountable for the learning 
of their students. School finance choices, from direct funding to supporting parental 
choice, will all be the subject of state policymaking and constitutional scrutiny in the next 
century. 
 
C.  The Impact of Educating on the Development of Constitutional Law 
 
Ultimately, education may have significant, and even determinative, input into what the 
Constitution means.  The first experience of what the Constitution means may well be in 
the role it plays in shaping the educational experience and lives of the students in the 
public schools.  Learning by example has always been one of the most powerful methods 
of learning.  
 
The Constitution has affected the lives of public school students while they are in the 
buildings in a number of ways likely to influence their civic education.  First Amendment 
50 See supra notes 8-11 and infra note 51-52. 
51 E.g., Anne Dodd, Parents as Partners, Not Problems, 63 THE EDUC. DIG. 36 (1998) (urging involving 
parents and developing communication to avoid conflict over curriculum and methods); Mary Sue Johns, 
The New Crusade: Parent Involvement, 94 SCH. ARTS 16 (1994) (“. . . number one priority in public school 
education is to reinvolve all parents. . .”); Jennifer Sabourin, Parental Rights Amendments:  Will a 
Statutory Right to Parent Force Children to “‘Shed Their Constitutional Rights’ at the Schoolhouse 
Door?” 44 WAYNE L. REV. 1899 (1999) (describing the controversy over parental control of education in 
the schools, especially over curriculum and discipline and questioning parental control); Deborah 
Wadsworth, Parents Parent, Teachers Teach, 10 The PUB. PERSP. 15 (1999) (“ . . . getting parents more 
involved . . . has become a basic tenet among educators . . .”). 
52 See, e.g., UNITED STATES DEP’T OF EDUCATION, AMERICA LOSS: AN EDUCATION STRATEGY 7 (1991);  
James Traub, What No School Can Do, NEW YORK TIMES MAG., Jan. 16, 2000, at 52.  
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free expression rights, although subject to modification in the schooling context, have 
been applied to permit unpopular, but nondisruptive political speech,53 to protect against 
library censorship motivated by disagreement with ideas expressed,54 to provide equal 
access to school facilities to religious as well as secular student groups,55 and to limit 
editorial control over school newspapers to actions reasonably related to pedagogical 
concerns.56 Following the line of reasoning permitting more limited application of rights, 
Fourth Amendment cases have permitted random drug testing and “reasonable” purse 
searches, citing pedagogical and disciplinary reasons, and finding lowered expectations 
of privacy for children in school-controlled settings.57  Setting the parameters of student 
rights will no doubt continue into the next century. 
 
Constitutional values are conveyed by the way in which schools are designed, funded, 
and populated, as well as by the rights accorded to students within the walls of the 
buildings. 
 
Outside of the public school context, the way we teach the Constitution (and the process 
of Constitutional interpretation and enforcement) to its future interpreters and civic 
leaders will profoundly influence Constitutional development.  Several commentators 
have noted the importance of the twentieth century focus on individual rights, and the 
litigation-oriented, court-centered methodology that has been used to develop that 
focus.58  The way law students have been educated (the case method) probably had a 
profound effect on the resort to the courts for enforcement.  Ahistorical, abstract, and 
unduly sanguine applications of constitutional doctrine and analysis may also cause 
distortions attributable to the way we educate practitioners and public decision-makers.59  
There are other ways of knowing and explicating Constitutional meaning, and the 
question is how will our future legal education prepare lawyers, judges, legislators, and 
citizens to engage in that explication process.  
 
                                                          
53 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (recognizing First Amendment rights to 
engage in nondisruptive speech). 
54 Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982) (holding that school library cannot exercise total discretion 
to censor books if their decision is motivated by a desire to remove access to ideas with which they 
disagree). 
55 Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990) and Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (finding 
that high schools and universities respectively cannot prohibit a voluntary student organization prayer 
group from using school facilities to meet on an equal access basis) (Equal Access Act interpreted in the 
Mergens situation). 
56 Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988) (holding that school officials can exercise 
editorial control over expression in school-sponsored activities like a school paper when their actions are 
reasonably related to a pedagogical concern). 
57 See supra note 16 (cases only). 
58 E.g., MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE (1991); 
Sherry, supra note 1, at 133-45 (noting the rights-oriented liberalism of 20th century spurring republican 
and neorepublican theories, and evaluating strengths and weaknesses in each focus, and citing many 
contemporary thinkers); and 146-47 (highlighting critiques of the “peculiarly American” exaggerated focus 
on rights). 
59 See, e.g., Curtis, supra note 17; Finkelman, supra note 17; Gottlieb, supra note 17; Tushnet, supra note 
17. 
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IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
Education has profoundly influenced the way we view and interpret the fundamental 
tenets of our constitutional system and the rights and responsibilities at its core. The 
Constitution has had an equally critical impact on whom and how we educate, in both 
content and form.  As we address the policy issues of the twenty-first century, our 
educational strategies and reforms will be adopted and judged against a template of 
constitutional legitimacy, rooted in twentieth century precedents, and our Constitution 
will grow and develop within the framework that its practitioners have been educated to 
use. Undoubtedly, the principles we develop and apply to evaluate the constitutionality of 
actions within the educational context will continue to have striking effects on what the 
Constitution means in all aspects of our lives.  It will behoove us to do things well.  The 
thoughtful input of scholars such as those we have assembled here should help us do just 
that. 
